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Differentially Private Combinatorial Cloud
Auction
Tianjiao Ni, Zhili Chen*, Lin Chen, Hong Zhong, Shun Zhang, Yan Xu
Abstract—Cloud service providers typically provide different types of virtual machines (VMs) to cloud users with various requirements.
Thanks to its effectiveness and fairness, auction has been widely applied in this heterogeneous resource allocation. Recently, several
strategy-proof combinatorial cloud auction mechanisms have been proposed. However, they fail to protect the bid privacy of users from
being inferred from the auction results. In this paper, we design a differentially private combinatorial cloud auction mechanism (DPCA)
to address this privacy issue. Technically, we employ the exponential mechanism to compute a clearing unit price vector with a
probability proportional to the corresponding revenue. We further improve the mechanism to reduce the running time while maintaining
high revenues, by computing a single clearing unit price, or a subgroup of clearing unit prices at a time, resulting in the improved
mechanisms DPCA-S and its generalized version DPCA-M, respectively. We theoretically prove that our mechanisms can guarantee
differential privacy, approximate truthfulness and high revenue. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that DPCA can generate
near-optimal revenues at the price of relatively high time complexity, while the improved mechanisms achieve a tunable trade-off
between auction revenue and running time.
Index Terms—Cloud computing, Differential privacy, Virtual Machine, Combinatorial auction, Truthfulness, Revenue
F
1 INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing provides a platform for a large num-ber of users to access computing resources such as CPU
and memory. Today, cloud service providers (e.g., Ama-
zon EC2 and Microsoft Azure) typically use virtualization
techniques to configure their resources as different types of
Virtual Machines (VM) and then sell them to cloud users
with fixed-price methods. Regrettably, fixed-price allocation
mechanisms cannot reflect the dynamic supply-demand
relationship of the market and may lead to economic in-
efficiency. To mitigate this problem, auction-based pricing
polices have emerged in the cloud market. For example, the
Amazon EC2 Spot Instance [1] has employed an auction
mechanism to allocate idle VM instances to users. Auction
has been proven to be an effective market-based cloud
service transaction mechanism not only allowing users to
get the resources they need at appropriate prices, but also
enabling cloud providers to leverage more resources to
improve their profits.
In an auction mechanism, truthfulness (a.k.a. strategy-
proofness) is one of the most crucial economic properties.
A truthful auction incentivizes bidders to bid their true
valuations. Recently, a number of truthful cloud auction
mechanisms [2], [3], [4] have been developed. Unfortu-
nately, maximizing utility therein comes at the expense of
disclosing bid information, which reflects the bidders’ pref-
erences and demands for VM resources. Adversaries may
utilize these bids to infer bidders’ computing requirements,
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the workload patterns and etc. These information may be
vital commercial secrets. Therefore, it is important to protect
bidders’ bid privacy.
To prevent information leakage, only a handful of re-
searches [5] has focused on privacy protection in cloud
auction, which protects privacy from a dishonest auctioneer
in the process of auction computations. But it did not
consider that an attacker can infer the bid information
based on the published outcome. Usually, the auctioneer is
considered to be trusted in a sealed auction, and he will
publish the auction results including the winners and their
payments. In most of the cloud auctions, VM resources are
only available to bidders for a certain period of time, bidders
may participate in cloud auction frequently. However, once
bidders submit the true valuation to the reliable auctioneer,
an attacker (who may be a bidder or anyone seeing these
outcomes except the auctioneer) may infer some private
information of bidders from outcomes of two or more
auctions.
To address this privacy issue, the notion of differential
privacy [6], which can preserve privacy for published results
with strong theoretical guarantee, has been applied as a
compelling privacy model. While there exist a number of
differentially private auction-based mechanisms [7], [8], [9],
[10] to limit privacy leakage, cloud auction with differen-
tial privacy guarantee [11] remains largely unaddressed,
especially for the combinatorial auctions that are the most
suitable for solving VM pricing and allocation problems.
Unlike traditional auctions, design a differentially private
auction mechanism in heterogeneous environment is a non-
trivial task. On the one hand, different users request a set of
VM instances of different types. A reasonable pricing and
allocation strategies should depend on the VM instances
they request. Meanwhile, it should motivate bidders to
report their true valuation while guaranteing the revenue
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of the provider. On the other hand, reporting the true
valuations may disclose bidders’ privacy information ( bids
and the number of VM instances ). The auction mechanism
should be designed to achieve both truthfulness and privacy
protection.
To cope with the aforementioned challenges, we de-
velop a Differentially Private Combinatorial Cloud Auction
(DPCA) mechanism in this paper, where a cloud service
provider provides various types of VMs to heterogeneous
users. To keep users’ bids private and achieve high revenue
of the provider, we leverage the exponential mechanism
to select the final clearing unit price vector, exponentially
proportional to the corresponding revenue. Technically, the
mechanism is carefully designed to meet the instance con-
straint and achieve approximate truthfulness. Armed with
the baseline mechanism, we further reduce the running time
while maintaining the high revenue, by computing a single
clearing unit price, or a subgroup of clearing unit prices at
a time, resulting in the improved mechanisms DPCA-S and
its generalized version DPCA-M, respectively.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply
differential privacy in combinatorial cloud auction.
Our proposition DPCA can not only prevent the dis-
closure of bidders’ bids, but also ensure approximate
truthfulness and high revenue.
• To reduce computational complexity, we propose
DPCA-S which uses an exponential mechanism to
select single unit price of one type of VM each time.
Furthermore, we design DPCA-M to select the com-
bination of multiple unit prices at a time to improve
revenue.
• We fully implement the proposed mechanisms, and
conduct extensive experiments to evaluate their per-
formances. The experimental results demonstrate
that DPCA can generate near-optimal revenue at the
price of relatively high time complexity, while the
improved mechanisms achieve a tunable trade-off
between auction revenue and running time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 briefly reviews the related work. In Section 3,
we introduce auction model and some important concepts.
And we present the detailed design of DPCA and prove
the related properties in Section 4. And we further propose
the improved mechanisms in Section 5. In Section 6, we im-
plement our mechanisms, and evaluate their performances.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
As an effective transaction method, auction has been ex-
tensively used in the field of cloud computing. Wang et
al. [2] proposed a computationally efficient and truthful
cloud auction mechanism. And Zaman et al. [3] designed
a combinatorial auction mechanism for the case of static
provisioning of VM instances, which can capture the com-
petition of users. To satisfy user’s demand and generate
higher revenue or social welfare, [12], [13], [14] proposed
the truthful mechanisms for dynamic VM provisioning and
allocation. Zhang et al. [15] designed a randomized combi-
natorial auction by leveraging a pair of primal and dual lin-
ear programs (LPs). Du et al. [16] studied a deep reinforce-
ment learning approach in the cloud resource allocation and
pricing to maximize the provider’s revenue. In paper [17],
the authors presented a generalized dominant resource fair-
ness mechanism in heterogeneous environments. Recently,
online auction mechanisms [4], [18], [19] have attracted a
great deal of attention. Zhang et al. [18] utilized the pricing-
curve method and proposed a truthful online auction with
one type of VM. Later, papers [4], [19] took into account het-
erogeneous VM instances. And in the Blockchain networks,
the paper [20] proposed an auction-based market model to
realize the efficient allocation of computing resources for
the transactions between the cloud/fog computing service
provider and miners. However, none of these researches
addressed the privacy concerns.
In recent years, people have paid more attention to
the issue of privacy. To the best of our knowledge, only
a few auction-based cloud resource allocation mechanisms
took privacy into consideration. Chen et al. [5] designed a
privacy-preserving cloud auction with cryptographical tech-
niques. Later, for the two-sided cloud market, Cheng et al.
[21] proposed a efficient privacy-preserving double auction
mechanism. It did not disclose any information about bid
other than the auction results. To prevent the attacker from
inferring sensitive information based on published outcome,
the concept of differential privacy is proposed. McSherry
et al. [7] proposed the first differentially private auction
mechanism. Then, differential privacy has been applied to
specifical auction-based scenarios including spectrum auc-
tions [8], [22], [23], spectrum sensing [24] and mobile crowd
sensing [9], [10], [25], [26]. In paper [11], incorporating
differential privacy, the authors proposed an auction-based
mechanism for resource allocation in cloud in the presence
of only one type of VM. As far as we know, none of existing
works proposes the cloud auction mechanism for multiply
types of VMs allocation with differential privacy guarantee.
3 TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the auction model for com-
binatorial virtual machine provisioning and allocation in
cloud computing, and review some important concepts to
facilitate the comprehension of our schemes.
3.1 Cloud Auction Model
We consider a sealed-bid cloud resource allocation auction
with an auctioneer (seller) and a group of buyers, which
is completed in a time windom. A Cloud Service Provider
(CSP), i.e., the auctioneer who is trustworthy, sets m differ-
ent types of virtual machine (VM) instances represented by
M = {VM1, V M2, ..., V Mm}. These m types of instances
are mainly composed of different CPU powers (e.g., dual-
core, quad-core), memory sizes (e.g., small, medium, large),
and operating systems (e.g., Linux/UNIX, Microsoft Win-
dows), etc. Each type of VM has only a certain number of
instances. Let K = {K1,K2, ...,Km} denote the profile of
all types of VM instances, where Ki represents the number
of VMi instances offered by the CSP with values in the
range [Kmin,Kmax].
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Suppose there are n users as buyers requesting these VM
instances. Here N = {1, 2, ..., n} denotes the set of users.
Each user j submits his bid profile Bj =< kj , bj >, where
kj = {k1j , k2j , ..., kmj } denotes the profile of numbers of m
different types of VM instances requested by user j, and
bj = {b1j , b2j , ..., bmj } represents the profile of the per-instance
bids form different types of VM instances submitted by user
j. Here, we assume that the number of VMi instances that
user j requests is in the interval [0, qmax]. And it should
meet the requirement of qmax  Ki (If the user requests
a large number of resources, he can work directly with the
provider, without the need for the auction). The bid of user
j is based on his true valuation for the same VM instances
denoted by vj = {v1j , v2j , ..., vmj }, and vij is limited in the
range of [vmin, vmax]. If the user j is not interested in VMi
, then vij = 0. The total bid of user j for his desired VM
bundle is Bj =
∑m
i=1 k
i
jb
i
j . And the corresponding total
valuation is V j =
∑m
i=1 k
i
jv
i
j . The profile of bid of all users
is represented by B = {B1, B2, ..., Bn}.
The outcome of an auction contains the profiles of al-
location and payment. Let x = {x1, x2..., xn} denote the
allocation profile, where xj ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the
user j gets the requested VM instances. The payments are
represented by P = {P1, P2, ..., Pn} where Pj is the price
that user j ultimately pays. Here we consider the users
are single-minded. They are only willing to pay for the
VM instances they request, and for other VM instances, the
payments are zero (i.e., Pj = 0).
In an auction, each user j is considered selfish and
rational, and his objective is to maximize his own utility
uj :
uj = V jxj − Pj
The CSP also wants to maximize his revenue, where the
revenue is the sum of payments of all users:
REV =
n∑
j=1
Pjxj
3.2 Attack model
In the truthful cloud auction mechanism where the auc-
tioneer is trusted, it requires each bidder to submit his
true valuation. But once the true valuation is submitted,
the attacker (anyone other than the auctioneer) can infer
the bidder’s private information from the public auction
outcome. In most of the cloud auctions, VM instances are
only available for short-term use by bidders, so bidders may
participate in auctions frequently. This makes it easier to
leak private information.
To better understand this attack model, we present an at-
tack example as shown in Fig. 1. Suppose there are two types
of VM with one VM1 instance and two VM2 instances. And
three buyers compete for these instances, in which Buyer 1
requests one VM1 instance and one VM2 instance with total
bid 12, Buyer 2 requests one VM1 instance with total bid
10 and Buyer 3 requests one VM2 instance with total bid
8. According to the truthful cloud auction [2], the winners
are Buyer 2 and Buyer 3. Here we simplify the ranking
metric [2] to average bid per each instance. And the payments
of Buyer 2, Buyer 3 are 6 and 0, respectively. Assume that
Buyer 2 is an attacker, and he changes his total bid from 10
Buyer 1
Auctioneer
Buyer 2 Buyer 3
VM1 : 1
VM2 : 2
VM1 : 1
VM2 : 1
`B1 : 12
VM1 : 1
`B2 : 10
VM2 : 1
`B3 : 8
Fig. 1. A cloud auction attack example
to 5 in the second auction, while other buyers’ bids remain
unchanged. Then the auction result becomes that winners
are Buyer 1 and Buyer 3 and their payments are 10 and 0,
respectively. According to the fact thatBuyer 3 pays 0 in the
second auction, it can be known that he has no critical bidder
[2]. And it is easy for Buyer 2 to deduce that Buyer 3 only
requests VM2 and his average bid per each instance is more
than 5, since if Buyer 3 requests VM1, the loser Buyer 2
requesting one VM1 instance will be his critical bidder. It is
also known that the average bid per each instance of Buyer 1
is between 5 and 10 by the fact that if Buyer 2 bids 10, he
will win, and if he bids 5, he will be replaced by Buyer 1.
So the privacy of Buyer 1 and Buyer 3 is compromised.
3.3 Mechanism Design Concepts
Now we introduce some related solution concepts from
mechanism design and differential privacy. First, we review
the definition of the dominant strategy in an auction mech-
anism.
Definition 1 (Dominant Strategy [27]). Strategy si is a player
i’s dominant strategy in a game, if for any strategy s′i 6= si and
other players’ strategy profile s−i,
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i)
In an auction, truthfulness is associated with a dominant
strategy meaning that users reveal their truthful bids. But
in some cases, it is too restrictive to satisfy exact truthful-
ness. So we turn to consider a weaker but more practical
version of truthfulness, that is, approximate truthfulness or
γ-truthfulness [28].
Definition 2 (γ-truthfulness). Let V j denote the total bid when
user j bids truthfully. A auction mechanism is γ-truthfulness in
expectation, if and only if for any total bid Bj 6= V j and other
users’ total bid profile V−j, it satisfies
E[uj(V j ,V−j)] ≥ E[uj(Bj ,V−j)]− γ
where γ is a small constant.
Differential privacy [6], [29] ensures that for any two
databases differing in one record, the probability of out-
putting the same result is essentially identical. Thus it is
difficult for an adversary to infer users’ private information
from the auction results.
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Definition 3 (Differential Privacy). LetB denote the bid profile
of all users for required VM instances. A randomized cloud
auction mechanism M is -differentially private if for any two
two data profiles B and B′ with only one different bid, and S ⊆
Range(M), it satisfies
Pr[M(B) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[M(B′) ∈ S]
where  is a small positive constant called privacy budget
meaning the level of privacy protection.
Exponential mechanism [7] is an effective tool to realize
differential privacy. It determines a utility score for any
possible output, and the higher score is, the more likely the
candidate output will be chosen. Specifically, it is defined as
follows:
Definition 4 (Exponential Mechanism). Given a range P and
a utility function Q(B, p) which maps a pair of the input profile
B and an output p in the range P to a real-valued score. The
exponential mechanismM(B, Q,P) selects and outputs p ∈ P
with probability
Pr[M(B, Q,P) = p] ∝ exp(Q(B, p)
2∆Q
)
where ∆Q is the sensitivity of function Q, that is, for any p ∈ P
and for any two profiles B and B′ differing in a single element,
the largest change in Q(B, p) and Q(B′, p), and  is the privacy
budget.
Theorem 1 ( [30]). The exponential mechanism guarantees -
differential privacy.
Lemma 1 (Composition [30]). Given the randomized algo-
rithmsM1,M2,...,Mk that satisfies 1-differential privacy, 2-
differential privacy,..., k-differential privacy, respectively. Then
M(D) = (M1(D),M2(D), ...,Mk(D)) satisfies (
∑k
i=1 i)-
differential privacy.
4 DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE COMBINATORIAL
CLOUD AUCTION (DPCA)
In this section, we elaborate our differentially private mech-
anism for combinatorial cloud auctions, DPCA, and provide
theoretical analysis of its related properties.
4.1 Design Rationales
We integrate the concept of differential privacy with the
problem of heterogeneous cloud resource allocation, and
design a combinatorial cloud auction mechanism which
preserves differential privacy, achieves truthfulness, and
realizes good revenues. Two main challenges and their
corresponding design rationales are as follows.
The first challenge is how to design a pricing strategy to
ensure reasonable pricing, which is good for achieving the
property of truthfulness and yielding high auction revenues.
Our observation is that, for heterogeneous cloud auctions,
the total payment of each winner is dependent on both
unit prices and numbers of VMs, and thus the pricing for
different users should have similar dependence. Based on
this observation, we apply a two-level pricing. The first level
pricing is a vector of all unit prices, providing a common
pricing; The second level is total prices for users computed
based on both unit prices and numbers of VMs, providing
user-related pricing. Then the payments of users is propor-
tional to the numbers of VMs they requested, which is easy
for users to accept.
Since there is a risk of privacy disclosure in submitting
the true valuations, how to design the VM allocation pro-
cedure to achieve both differential privacy and truthfulness
is the second challenge. To address this challenge, we first
apply the exponential mechanism to select a unit price
vector, achieving the differential privacy. Then, to achieve
truthfulness, we design a random VM allocation algorithm
by first selecting a winner candidate set through the unit
price vector, and then allocating VMs to winner candidates
in a random order with instance constraints. Here, instance
constraints refer to the conditions that all numbers of VMs
allocated should be no more than those provided.
4.2 Detailed Design
In the design, the domain of each unit price ρi of VMi (0 ≤
i ≤ m) is defined as Π = [vmin..vmax], where each unit price
ρi can take all the different possible valuation/bid values in
Π. As a result, the unit clearing prices can be represented by
a vector ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρm) ∈ Πm. The procedure of DPCA
can be described in the following two phases.
(1) Price Vector Selection. In this phase, DPCA applies
an instance of the exponential mechanism to select the
clearing price vector, where revenues are used as the utility
function. This phase can be further divided into three steps
as follows.
(a) Winner Candidate Selection.This step selects winner
candidates through price comparison. Specifically, given the
clearing price vector ρ ∈ Πm, the clearing price of user j can
be computed as
Pj =
m∑
i=1
kijρi (1)
Then user j is selected as a candidate if
Bj ≥ Pj (2)
Through this step, the users, whose total bids are not
less than their corresponding total payments at price ρ,
are selected as winner candidates. We denote the set of
candidates byWc and assume that h = |Wc|.
(b) Random VM Allocation. In this step, the CSP sorts these
h candidates randomly, such that whether a candidate is a
winner is totally independent of its bid. This randomness is
important for the achievement of truthfulness as we will
discuss later in the theoretical proofs. However, the ran-
domness is actually predetermined by the auctioneer before
the auction. We adopt the idea of the matching random
string [23] to ensure that the revenues corresponding to
all clearing prices are unique, and hence revenues can be
used as a utility function for the exponential mechanism.
Here we use r to represent the random string. Specially,
r is a sufficiently long bit string that can determine an
order of any candidate set for all possible price vectors. And
each part of r indicates the random sort of candidates of
a certain price vector ρ. Then given a price vector ρ as the
clearing price vector, and an allocation order represented
by r, our mechanism chooses the first user that satisfies
the instance constraint (e.g., the VM instances requested
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by the user does not exceed the amount of VM instances
provided by the provider) as the winner while updating
the instance constraint, and then chooses the next winner
as above. The iteration continues until all users inWc have
been examined, and the winner set W is obtained. Then
the corresponding revenue of the CSP can be calculated as
follows.
REV (B,K, r, ρ) =
∑
j∈W
m∑
i=1
ρik
i
j (3)
(c) Probabilistic Price Selection. Steps (a) and (b) are carried
out given a price vector ρ. For the achievement of privacy
protection and better revenue, we introduce the exponential
mechanism to select the price ρ with revenues of the CSP
as its utility function. Thus, this step needs to repeatedly
perform the previous two steps to get the revenues corre-
sponding to all possible price vectors ρ, given a random
string r. Then the probability distribution of clearing price
vectors can be computed as follows.
Pr(M(B,K, r) = ρ) = exp(
REV (B,K,r,ρ)
2∆ )∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(
REV (B,K,r,ρ′)
2∆ )
(4)
where  is the privacy budget, and ∆ = m · qmaxvmax, i.e.,
the possible maximum change in revenue that alters one’s
bid.
Based on the probability distribution (4), DPCA ran-
domly chooses a final clearing unit price vector ρ. Algo-
rithm 1 describes the procedure in details.
(2) Winner Computation. Given a random string r, once
the final clearing price vector ρ is chosen, the winners will
be determined accordingly. Then each winner j will pay the
CSP Pj =
∑m
i=1 ρik
i
j . And the final revenue of the CSP is
REV (B,K, r, ρ).
Algorithm 1 Price Vector Selection
Input: B, K, N, r and privacy budget .
Output: Final clearing price ρ
1: Initialize x1 = ... = xn = 0,W ← ∅,Wc ← ∅
2: ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρm) ∈ Πm
3: for all ρ ∈ Πm do
4: for j = 1, ..., n do
5: if
∑m
i=1 k
i
jb
i
j ≥
∑m
i=1 k
i
jρi then
6: Wc ←Wc ∪ j
7: end if
8: end for
9: Rank the h candidates inWc according to r
10: for j = 1, ..., h do
11: if ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m},∑j−1t=1 kitxt + kij ≤ Ki then
12: xj = 1,W ←W ∪ j
13: end if
14: end for
15: Calculate the revenue of the CSP :
REV (B,k, r, ρ)←∑j∈W∑mi=1 ρikijxj
16: end for
17: Randomly select a final clearing price ρ from Πm accord-
ing to the following distribution:
Pr(ρ) =
exp( REV (B,k,r,ρ)2∆ )∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(
REV (B,k,r,ρ′)
2∆ )
18: return ρ
4.3 Analysis
In this subsection, we focus on analyzing and proving de-
sirable properties of DPCA, namely its privacy (Theorem 2),
truthfulness (Theorem 3), and its high revenue (Theorem 3).
In the following analysis, for the changes in the bid profile
Bj of one user, we take into account the variations of both
per-instance bids bij and numbers of VMs k
i
j requested. The
inputs of our auction mechanism include the profile of all
types of instances and the randomness r. But these input
values are provided by the CSP and do not change, so
we will not write them out explicitly in expressions in the
following proof unless otherwise stated.
Theorem 2. DPCA achieves -differential privacy.
Proof. We denote B as the profile of bids for all users,
and denote any neighboring profile by B′, which is only
differing in the bid profile Bj of one user from B. Let M
denote the mechanism we designed to randomly select the
clearing price vector. For any ρ ∈ Πm and any pair of
profiles B and B′, the probability ratio of the clearing price
vector selected by the mechanismM is
Pr(M(B) = ρ)
Pr(M(B′) = ρ)
=
exp( REV (B,ρ)2∆ )∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(
REV (B,ρ′)
2∆ )
exp( REV (B
′,ρ)
2∆ )∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(
REV (B′,ρ′)
2∆ )
=(
exp( REV (B,ρ)2∆ )
exp( REV (B
′,ρ)
2∆ )
)(
∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(
REV (B′,ρ′)
2∆ )∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(
REV (B,ρ′)
2∆ )
)
≤ exp( 
2
)(
∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(

2 )exp(
REV (B,ρ′)
2∆ )∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(
REV (B,ρ′)
2∆ )
)
≤ exp( 
2
) exp(

2
)(
∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(
REV (B,ρ′)
2∆ )∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(
REV (B,ρ′)
2∆ )
)
= exp()
Symmetrically, we have exp(−) ≤ Pr(M(B)=ρ)Pr(M(B′)=ρ) . Thus,
DPCA achieves -differential privacy.
Lemma 2. Given a random string r and a clearing price vector
ρ ∈ Πm, any user j cannot improve its utility by bidding
untruthfully, i.e., uj(Vj ,B−j) ≥ uj(Bj ,B−j).
Proof. In the following proof, we use x∗j and u
∗
j to represent
the allocation and utility of user j when his true valuation
is made, i.e., Bj = Vj . If Bj 6= Vj , it means that some
per-instance bids or some numbers of VMs requested are
different from true valuation’s, then Bj 6= V j . Here we
consider that users can only increase the number of VM
requested, since when the number of VM decrease, the de-
mand of users cannot be satisfied. Furthermore, we assume
that the additional VMs have a utility 0. The main proof falls
into several cases below.
• Case 1 (V j < Pj and x∗j = 0): We first consider
the change in per-instance bid. If bij < v
i
j , then∑m
i=1 k
i
jb
i
j <
∑m
i=1 k
i
jρi (i.e., Bj < Pj) and he also
loses (uj = u∗j = 0); else if b
i
j > v
i
j but
∑m
i=1 k
i
jb
i
j <
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i=1 k
i
jρi, he still does not win; else b
i
j > v
i
j and∑m
i=1 k
i
jb
i
j >
∑m
i=1 k
i
jρi >
∑m
i=1 k
i
jv
i
j , then he wins
and his utility is uj =
∑m
i=1 k
i
jv
i
j −
∑m
i=1 k
i
jρi < 0.
For increasing the number of requested VM with
true valuation, if
∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
bij <
∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
ρi (i.e.,
Bj < Pj
′) or
∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
bij >
∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
ρi but not
satisfies the instance constraint, then uj = 0; else∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
bij >
∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
ρi (i.e., Bj > Pj
′) and he
wins, since when increasing the numbers of VMs, the
utility of additional VMs is 0, and the total valuation
does not increase (i.e.,
∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
vij
′
=
∑m
i=1 k
i
jv
i
j).
So his utility is uj =
∑m
i=1 k
i
jv
i
j −
∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
ρi <∑m
i=1 k
i
jv
i
j −
∑m
i=1 k
i
jρi < 0.
• Case 2 (V j ≥ Pj and x∗j = 0): It means the requested
VM instances does not satisfy the instance constraint.
So given the random string r, no matter how the per-
instance bid or the number of VM requested changes,
he still won’t win. Therefore, u∗j = uj = 0.
• Case 3 (V j ≥ Pj and x∗j = 1): If bij < vij or
bij > v
i
j , and
∑m
i=1 k
i
jb
i
j ≥
∑m
i=1 k
i
jρi, then his utility
stays the same as the true valuation, i.e., uj = u∗j ;
else if bij < v
i
j and
∑m
i=1 k
i
jb
i
j <
∑m
i=1 k
i
jρi, then
he loses and his utility is uj = 0 < u∗j ; else if
the user j increases the number of VM requested
(i.e., kij
′
> kij), then
∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
bij >
∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
ρi, he
wins and his utility is uj =
∑m
i=1 k
i
jv
i
j−
∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
ρi <∑m
i=1 k
i
jv
i
j −
∑m
i=1 k
i
jρi = u
∗
j ; else the increasing VM
instances does not meet the instance constraint or∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
vij <
∑m
i=1 k
i
j
′
ρi , then uj = 0 < u∗j .
Therefore, it can be proved that no user can improve
his utility by bidding untruthfully, i.e., uj(Vj ,B−j) ≥
uj(Bj ,B−j).
Theorem 3. Given a random string r, DPCA is γ-truthful,
where γ = ·m · qmaxvmax.
Proof. From Theorem 2 and Lemma 2, we can get
exp(−)Pr(M(B′) = ρ) ≤ Pr(M(B) = ρ) and
uj(Vj , B−j , r, ρ) ≥ uj(Bj , B−j , r, ρ). Then the following
formula holds,
E[uj(Vj ,B−j, r, ρ)]
=
∑
ρ∈Πm
Pr(r)× Pr[M(Vj ,B−j) = ρ]× uj(Vj ,B−j, r, ρ)
≥ exp(−)
∑
ρ∈Πm
Pr(r)Pr[M(Bj ,B−j) = ρ] · uj(Bj ,B−j, r, ρ)
= exp(−)E[uj(Bj ,B−j, r, ρ)]
≥ (1− )E[uj(Bj ,B−j, r, ρ)]
= E[uj(Bj ,B−j, r, ρ)]− E[uj(Bj ,B−j, r, ρ)]
For any user j ∈ N, the ranges of unit price and true
valuation are [vmin, vmax] and the requested instances are
limited in the interval of [0, qmax], and the utility of user j
is uj =
∑m
i=1 k
i
jv
i
j −
∑m
i=1 k
i
jρi. Then
E[uj(Bj ,B−j, r, ρ)] ≤ maxuj ≤ m · qmaxvmax
So, E[uj(Vj ,B−j, r, ρ)] ≥ E[uj(Bj ,B−j, r, ρ)] −
mqmaxvmax
It satisfies the definition of approximate truthfulness.
Therefore, we have proved Theorem 3.
Lemma 3. Let OPT ∗ = maxρ∈ΠmREV (B, r, ρ) de-
note the maximum revenue of DPCA. And OPT is de-
fined the optimal revenue of the cloud auction, i.e., OPT =
maxρ∈Πm,r∈RREV (B, r, ρ), where R is the set of all possible
random strings. Then Kmin−qmax+1Kmax OPT ≤ OPT ∗ ≤ OPT .
Proof. Assuming that OPT = REV (B, ropt, ρopt), then
the revenue of DPCA corresponding to ρopt is OPT ′ =
REV (B, r, ρopt). Therefore, we get OPT ′ ≤ OPT ∗ ≤
OPT . Since REV =
∑
j∈W
∑m
i=1 ρik
i
j and the total number
of instances of each type VM requested by all winners will
not exceed Kmax, we have OPT ≤ Kmax
∑m
i=1 ρopti . As
for ρopt in DPCA, the number of instances of each type
VM requested is at least Kmin − qmax + 1, then we can
get OPT ′ ≥ (Kmin − qmax + 1)
∑m
i=1 ρopti . So we can
derive the relationship between OPT and OPT ′ expressed
as OPT ′ ≥ Kmin−qmax+1Kmax OPT . Thus,
Kmin−qmax+1
Kmax
OPT ≤
OPT ∗ ≤ OPT .
Theorem 4. The expected revenue of the CSP E[REV (B, r, ρ)]
is at least Kmin−qmax+1Kmax OPT − 6∆ ln(e+
|Πm|OPT
2∆ ).
Proof. LetOPT ∗ =maxρ∈Πm REV (B, r, ρ) denote the max-
imum revenue for the mechanism M. For a small constant
t > 0, define the sets Rt = {ρ ∈ Πm : REV (B, r, ρ) >
OPT ∗ − t} and R2t = {ρ ∈ Πm : REV (B, r, ρ) ≤
OPT ∗ − 2t}. Then we have
Pr(M(B) ∈ R2t) ≤ Pr(M(B) ∈ R2t)
Pr(M(B) ∈ Rt)
=
∑
ρ∈R2t
exp( REV (B,r,ρ)2∆ )∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(
REV (B,r,ρ′)
2∆ )∑
ρ∈Rt
exp( REV (B,r,ρ)2∆ )∑
ρ′∈Πm exp(
REV (B,r,ρ′)
2∆ )
=
∑
ρ∈R2t exp(
REV (B,r,ρ)
2∆ )∑
ρ∈Rt exp(
REV (B,r,ρ)
2∆ )
≤ |R2t|exp(
(OPT∗−2t)
2∆ )
|Rt|exp( (OPT∗−t)2∆ )
=
|R2t|
|Rt| exp(
−t
2∆
)
≤ |Πm|exp(−t
2∆
)
Thus, Pr(M(B) ∈ R2t) ≥ 1 − |Πm|exp(−t2∆ ). And
if t satisfies the constraint that t ≥ 2∆ln(
|Πm|OPT∗
t )
 , then
Pr(M(B) ∈ R2t) ≥ 1− tOPT∗ .
Therefore, for any t ≥ 2∆ln(
|Πm|OPT∗
t )
 , we have
Eρ∈Πm [REV (B, r, ρ)] ≥
∑
ρ∈R2t
REV (B, r, ρ)Pr(M(B) = ρ)
≥ (OPT ∗ − 2t)(1− t
OPT ∗
)
≥ OPT ∗ − 3t
(5)
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Let t = 2∆ln(e+
|Πm|OPT∗
2∆ )
 ≥ 2∆ , and we have
2∆ln( |Π
m|OPT∗
t
)

≤ 2∆ln(e+
|Πm|OPT∗
2∆
)

= t
Then put t = 2∆ln(e+
|Πm|OPT∗
2∆ )
 into Eq. (5) and com-
bine Lemma 3, the expected utility of mechanismM can be
rewritten as
Eρ∈Πm [REV (B, r, ρ)]
≥ OPT ∗ − 3t
≥ OPT ∗ − 32∆ln(e+
|Πm|OPT∗
2∆ )

= OPT ∗ − 6∆

ln(e+
|Πm|OPT ∗
2∆
)
≥ Kmin − qmax + 1
Kmax
OPT − 6∆

ln(e+
|Πm|OPT
2∆
)
Therefore, Theorem 4 is proved that DPCA achieves
approximate maximization of the CSP’s revenue.
Note that since Ki  qmax, Kmin−qmax+1Kmax OPT ≈
Kmin
Kmax
OPT . And when Kmin ≈ Kmax, Lemma 3 is ex-
pressed as OPT ≤ OPT ∗ ≤ OPT . It then holds that:
Eρ∈Πm [REV (B, r, ρ)] ≥ OPT − 6∆

ln(e+
|Πm|OPT
2∆
).
We next analyze the computational complexity of Al-
gorithm 1. The calculation of the revenue includes |Πm|
iterations. In each iteration, the computational complexity
of winner candidate selection is O(nm). And the complex-
ity of sorting candidates is O(n log n) in general. In the
instance allocation phase, its computation cost is O(nm).
And the complexity of computing the revenue is O(nm).
Therefore, the computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(max{nm, n log n} · |Πm|).
5 IMPROVEMENT OF DPCA
As proved previously, our baseline proposition DPCA
demonstrate nice theoretical properties. However, its time
complexity is exponential to Π. In this section, we improve
our basic mechanism DPCA in terms of time efficiency and
auction benefit.
5.1 DPCA-S
In DPCA-S (S for single), we repeatedly adopt an instance of
exponential mechanism to select the unit price of one type
of VM until m unit prices are determined. In this way, we
avoid exhaustively searching all the combinations in Πm.
5.1.1 Design Details
In the design of DPCA-S, the domain of each unit price
ρl of VMl is also defined as Π = [vmin, vmax]. The main
difference is that the clearing price vector is determined
by selecting the unit prices one by one, instead of selecting
them as a combination. The procedure is also described in
following two phases.
(1) Price Vector Selection. This phase selects the unit
prices one by one with instances of exponential mechanism,
to reduce the computation complexity caused by DPCA. The
main challenge is how to design the utility function for each
instance of exponential mechanism. Our observation is that
when selecting the lth (1 ≤ l ≤ m − 1) unit price, only the
local information of the first l unit prices can be seen, and
thus the corresponding utility function should only depend
on this information. Therefore, when selecting the lth (1 ≤
l ≤ m−1) unit price, we only compare users’ bids and prices
of the first l types of VMs to estimate a partial revenue, and
use it as the utility value. After this, when selecting the mth
unit price, we can make use of the global information of unit
prices, and apply the same method as the previous section
to compute the revenue, using it as the utility value. This
phase can be depicted in three steps as follows.
(a) Partial Revenue Computation. Given the unit price
ρl ∈ Π and assuming that the unit prices of the first l − 1
VM types have been selected as ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρl−1, respectively,
DPCA-S calculates the partial bid of user j (j ∈ N) with the
bid information of the first l VM types using Eq. (6).
B
l
j =
l∑
i=1
kijb
i
j (6)
The corresponding partial price can be computed as follows.
P lj =
l∑
i=1
kijρi (7)
Then we can find the setWl = {j|Blj ≥ P lj |j ∈ N} of partial
winner candidates.
Given ρl and for the case of 1 ≤ l ≤ m − 1, the partial
revenue for the first l VM types can be computed with
Eq. (8).
REVl(B, ρl) =
∑
j∈Wl
l∑
i=1
ρik
i
j (8)
(b) Total Revenue Computation. When computing the to-
tal revenue, we go into a similar process as described in
Section 4-B. Specially, given the first m − 1 unit prices
ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρm−1, we can varies ρm and get |Π| price vectors.
The handling of the revenue computation goes similarly,
except that we have only |Π| price vectors instead of |Π|m
ones, and we do not go into details. LetW denote the set of
winners, given a price vector ρ and the random string r, the
total revenue can be computed as
REVm(B,K, r, ρm) =
∑
j∈W
m∑
i=1
ρik
i
j (9)
Note that we do not write other unit prices in Eqs. (8) and
(9) for simplicity. We will also not explicitly show K and r
in the following probability distribution calculations.
(c) Unit Price Selection. According to the exponential
mechanism, DPCA-S sets the probability of the unit price
ρl to be exponentially proportional to its corresponding
revenue.
Pr(Ml(B) = ρl) =
exp( lREVl(B,ρl)2∆l )∑
ρ′l∈Π exp(
lREVl(B,ρ′l)
2∆l
)
(10)
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where ∆l =
∑l
i=1 qmaxvmax = l · qmaxvmax, l = m is the
privacy budget, and 1 ≤ l ≤ m.
After this, each unit price ρl (1 ≤ l ≤ m) is randomly
selected based on its probability distribution. The detailed
process is described in Algorithm 2.
(3) Winner Computation. This phase is exactly the same
as that of DPCA.
Algorithm 2 Single-Unit-Price Selection
Input: B, K, N, r and privacy budget .
Output: Final clearing price ρ and WinnersW
1: Initialize x1 = ... = xn = 0,W1, ...,Wm,W ← ∅
2: Define ρl ∈ Π = [vmin, vmax], l = m
3: for l← 1 to m do
4: for ρl ∈ Π do
5: Wl ← {j|Blj ≥ P lj , j ∈ N}
6: if l ≤ m− 1 then
7: REVl(B, ρl) =
∑
j∈Wl
∑l
i=1 ρik
i
j
8: else
9: Rank the h candidates inWl based on r
10: for j ∈ Wl do
11: if ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m},∑j−1t=1 kitxt + kij ≤ Ki then
12: xj = 1,W ←W
⋃
j
13: end if
14: end for
15: REVl(B,K, r, ρl) =
∑
j∈W
∑l
i=1 ρik
i
j
16: end if
17: end for
18: for ρl ∈ Π do
19: Pr(Ml(B) = ρl) =
exp(
lREVl(B,ρl)
2∆l
)∑
ρ′
l
∈Π exp(
lREVl(B,ρ
′
l
)
2∆l
)
20: end for
21: ρl ←Ml(B)
22: end for
23: return ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρm)
5.1.2 Analysis
We now establish the economic properties of DPCA-S.
Theorem 5. DPCA-S achieves -differential privacy.
Proof. Let Ml denote the mechanism to select the unit
price ρl. For each mechanism Ml, it is simply an appli-
cation of the exponential mechanism, so it can achieve
l-differential privacy. Then, according to the composition
lemma (Lemma 1), DPCA-S achieves -differential privacy,
where  = 1 + 2 + ...+ m.
Theorem 6. DPCA-S achieves γ-truthful, where γ =  · m ·
qmaxvmax.
Proof. According to Theorem 5, we can get
exp(−)Pr(MS(B′) = ρ) ≤ Pr(MS(B) = ρ) where
MS represents the mechanism DPCA-S. Then the proof of
truthfulness is the same as Theorem 3.
It seems hard to give a theoretical bound for the rev-
enue of DPCA-S. Instead, we will provide an experimental
comparison between the revenues of DPCA-S and DPCA in
Section 6.
Finally, we analyze the computational complexity of the
Algorithm 2. The computational complexity of choosing
the prices of the first m − 1 types VM is O(nm · (m −
1) · Π). And the complexity of the last price’s choice is
O(max{nm, n log n}·Π). Thus, the computational complex-
ity of the Algorithm 2 isO(max{nm, n log n}·m ·Π). There-
fore, the complexity is greatly reduced from the exponential
level to linear level.
5.2 DPCA-M
In DPCA-S, we reduce the price space by selecting the
unit prices one by one. However, this benefit comes at the
price of reducing auction revenue because of large noise
introduced in every unit price selection. A natural question
is whether we can get a better auction result with an ac-
ceptable time efficiency. Following this line of thinking, we
design a differentially private mechanism for combinatorial
cloud auctions with multiple unit price selection, called
DPCA-M.
The main idea is that we regard t unit prices as a group,
each time applying an instance of exponential mechanism
to select a group of prices. Thus, we just have to use dm/te
exponential mechanism instances to confirm these m unit
prices. To realize the tradeoff between time and benefits, let
t satisfy the following inequality, i.e., 1 < t < m. Actually, it
can be interpreted as a generalization of DPCA and DPCA-S
in the sense that DPCA and DPCA-S are the extreme cases
when t = m and t = 1, respectively.
5.2.1 Design Details
In order to select a group of t prices, we can define
each group set ρ˜l = (ρ(l−1)t+1, ..., ρlt) in the domain of
Πt = [vmin, vmax]
t. For the last price group ρ˜dm/te =
(ρ(dm/te−1)t+1, ..., ρm), the number of types of VM may be
less than t, so its set is defined as Π(m−t(dm/te−1)). The
design can also be described in two phases as follows.
(1) Price Vector Selection. This phase is basically similar
to the unit price selection of DPCA-S. The significant differ-
ence is that we view t unit prices as a group, and randomly
pick them out together at a time. Therefore, in the process of
selecting ρ˜l, we should calculate the partial bids and partial
prices of the first l · t (1 ≤ l < dm/te) VM types, or in the
end the total bids and total prices of all m VM types. The
phase can be divided into two steps.
(a) Price Group Selection with Partial Revenue. For 1 ≤ l <
dm/te, we define the utility of the exponential mechanism
as
REVl(B, ρ˜l) =
∑
j∈Wl
lt∑
i=1
ρik
i
j (11)
Thus, a mechanism Ml chooses each price group ρ˜l with
the probability as
Pr(Ml(B) = ρ˜l) =
exp( lREV (B,ρ˜l)2∆l )∑
ρ˜′l∈Π exp(
lREV (B,ρ˜′l)
2∆l
)
(12)
where ∆l = l · t · qmaxvmax and l = dm/te is the privacy
budget.
(b) Price Group Selection with Total Revenue. For l = dm/te,
this step first determines a winner candidate set Wl as
previous step, and then uses a similar procedure as that of
DPCA to allocation VM with instance constraints, obtaining
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the winner setW , and finally computes the total revenue by
Eq. (13) as the utility of the exponential mechanism.
REVl(B,K, r, ρ˜l) =
∑
j∈W
m∑
i=1
ρik
i
j (13)
Then, the last unit price group is selected by Eq. (12) with
the sensitivity ∆dm/te = m · qmaxvmax.
(2) Winner Computation. This step is the same as that
of DPCA.
5.2.2 Analysis
Because DPCA-M can be viewed as a generalization of
DPCA-S, it is easy to see that DPCA-M achieves differential
privacy and approximate truthfulness. These proofs are
similar as those of DPCA-S and we omit them. For the
analysis of revenues, we again leverage the experimental
method.
Additionally, the computational complexity of DPCA-M
is O(max{nm, n log n} · dm/te · Πt), which is a trade-off
between DPCA and DPCA-S.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we fully implement our basic mechanism
DPCA, improved mechanisms DPCA-S and DPCA-M, and
do extensive experiments to evaluate their performances.
6.1 Experimental Setting
In the experimental setting, we consider the following two
scenarios due to the range of per-instance bids and the
numbers of VM types.
• Small Scale Scenario. We let per-instance bids of users
be generated randomly from the interval [0, 10], and
use small numbers of VM types (e.g. 2-6). This sce-
nario is mainly used for running DPCA, since its
computational complexity is Ω(Πm), and when the
size of Π and m are bigger, the execution time of
DPCA may become unbearable. This also explains
the necessity of DPCA-S and DPCA-M.
• Practical Scenario. We let per-instance bids be gener-
ated randomly from the interval [0, 100], and apply
more practical numbers of VM types (e.g. 20). This
scenario is mainly used for evaluating the perfor-
mances of DPCA-S and DPCA-M.
Other parameters are set as follows. The numbers of
VM instances Ki(i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}) and those requested by
users kij are uniformly distributed over [Kmin,Kmax] and
[0, 10], respectively. By default, the total privacy budget 
is 1 and T represents the combination of T unit prices of
DPCA-M. Note that  = 1 is the total privacy budget, the
privacy budget for each exponential mechanism of DPCA-S
is /m and that of DPCA-M is /dm/T e. The experimental
results are the averaged over 100 trials. For the performance
evaluation, we adopt the following metrics:
• Revenue: The sum of the price paid by all winning
users.
• User Satisfaction: The ratio of the number of winning
users to the total number of all users.
• Running Time: The time spent to execute an auction.
6.2 Experimental Results
When evaluating the performance of the proposed mech-
anisms, we compare them with a truthful cloud auction
mechanism without privacy guarantee (denoted by ”Basic”)
in [2].
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(1) Performance comparisons in small scale scenario.
In Fig. 2, we plot the revenues and running times of
DPCA and Basic as the number of VM types varies from
2 to 6, with n = 100 and Ki ∈ [100, 200]. From Fig. 2(a),
we can see that the revenues of both mechanisms increase
as m increases, and Basic’s revenue is superior to that of
DPCA, since DPCA sacrifices some of its revenue to achieve
differential privacy. In Fig. 2(b), the running time of Basic
is basically maintained at around 10 millisecond, while that
of DPCA increases very fast as m grows. This is because
that, with the increase of m, the space for the unit price
combination becomes exponentially large, which leads to
that the running time of DPCA also gets large rapidly. In a
word, the experimental results demonstrate that DPCA pro-
vides privacy preservation with a mild revenue cost, but it is
only suitable for auctions with small numbers of VM types,
otherwise the running time would grow exponentially fast.
Fig. 3 illustrates the comparisons of the revenues, user
satisfactions and running times for DPCA, DPCA-S, DPCA-
M and Basic, as the range [Kmin,Kmax] varies from
[100, 200] to [500, 600], and m = 6, n = 100. Note that we
use the midpoint (i.e., Kmin+Kmax2 ) of a range to represent
the range. From Fig. 3(a), we make the following observa-
tions. (a) the revenue of Basic increases as the numbers of
VMs increase before the range [300, 400], after which the
revenue drops steeply to nearly zero. (b) The revenues of
DPCA, DPCA-S, DPCA-M all grow with the increase of
numbers of VMs and eventually exceeds that of Basic. (c)
DPCA performs the best, DPCA-M with T = 3 takes the
second place, and DPCA-S is the last one.
The reason for observation (a) is that the payment
scheme of Basic is based on critical users. As the numbers
of VM increase, the VMs becomes oversupplied and more
and more users win, and it is hard to find a critical user
for each winner. Eventually, when all users win, the rev-
enue becomes 0. For observation (b), the cause is that our
mechanisms DPCA, DPCA-S, DPCA-M are priced accord-
ing to the exponential mechanism. After selecting the final
clearing unit price vector, more winners will generate higher
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revenue. The reason underlying observation (c) may be as
follows. DPCA employs only an instance of exponential
mechanism, DPCA-M employs more, and DPCA-S employs
the most. The more instances of exponential mechanism
employed, the more noise introduced, resulting in poorer
revenues. Furthermore, DPCA uses global bid information
for pricing, while DPCA-M and DPCA-S use partial bid
information. The partial information may deteriorates the
revenues.
Expectedly, in Fig. 3(b), user satisfaction of all mecha-
nisms grows with the number of VM. Basic’s increases to
100% but others gradually approaches an equilibrium. The
reason is as for observation (a). And Fig. 3(c) depicts the
running time of all mechanisms. DPCA takes much longer
than the other mechanisms and the running time increases
as the number of VM groups while the time of the other
mechanisms remain roughly constant between 10 and 20
milliseconds. The running times shown are as expected.
The experimental results in Fig. 3 indicate that on the ba-
sis of privacy guarantee, DPCA can obtain the best revenues
with the longest running time, DPCA-S produce the worst
revenues but with the least running time, while DPCA-
M achieves in-between revenues and in-between running
times. Meanwhile, when the number of VM provided is
much higher than the number requested by users, our
proposed mechanisms generates higher revenue than the
mechanism without privacy protection.
Fig. 4 depicts the revenues and running times for DPCA
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and DPCA-M under different T as Ki changes. And we fix
m = 6 and n = 100, respectively. As shown in Fig. 4(a), the
revenues of all mechanisms increases as Ki increases. For
DPCA-M, the larger T is, the higher revenue is. And DPCA
which can be view as T = 6 generates the highest revenue.
From Fig. 4(b), we can see that the running time of DPCA-
M under different T remains basically consistent and is less
than 30 milliseconds, while that of DPCA is more than 10
seconds, which increase linearly with the increase ofKi. The
above observations show that for DPCA-M, the more unit
prices in the group, the higher the revenue.
Fig. 5 traces the revenues and user satisfactions of our
mechanisms as the privacy budget  varies from 0.2 to 1,
when m = 6, n = 100, Ki ∈ [100, 200] and DPCA-M under
T = 3. It can be seen that with the increase of privacy budget
, both revenue and user satisfaction of three mechanisms
show increasing trends. It demonstrates that the higher the
privacy budget, the better the benefit of the auction.
(2) Performance comparisons in practical scenario.
Fig. 6 further illustrates the performance of DPCA-S and
DPCA-M as the number of users increases from 150 to 350
in practical scenarios where m = 20, Ki ∈ [300, 400] and
the range of the per-instance bids is [0, 100]. Under this con-
figuration, we cannot run DPCA because the running time
is quite unbearable. Expectedly, in Fig. 6(a), the revenues
of all mechanisms increase as the number of users raises.
Also the curve of Basic outperforms that of the other three
mechanisms. For DPCA-S and DPCA-M under different T ,
the revenue of DPCA-M under T = 2 is superior to that of
DPCA-S, but is inferior to that of DPCA-M under T = 3.
From Fig. 6(b), we can observe that the user satisfaction
of all mechanisms is gradually decreasing and eventually
getting close when the supply is getting low. In Fig. 6(c), it
is obvious that the running time of DPCA-M under T = 3 is
much higher than that of other mechanisms. And the time
of DPCA-S is minimal and no more than 200 milliseconds,
while DPCA-M under T = 2 spends more time than Basic,
but does not exceed 5 seconds. All the time is practically
acceptable. The above experimental results show that both
DPCA-S and DPCA-M are applicable to the practical scenar-
ios and can generate good revenue. Moreover, for DPCA-M,
the more unit prices in the group, the longer time consumed.
And DPCA-M with an appropriate T will provide a good
trade-off between running times and auction revenues.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a differentially private
mechanism for combinatorial cloud auctions, called DPCA.
To achieve differential privacy, appriximate truthfulness and
high revenue, we randomly select the final clearing unit
price vector based on the specific probability distribution.
Through theoretical analysis, we prove the properties in
privacy, truthfulness and revenue. Considering the time
and benefits, we further develop DPCA-S and DPCA-M.
We conduct simulations to evaluate their performance. The
experimental results demonstrate that DPCA can generate
better revenue but is only appropriate for small-scale cloud
auctions, while DCPA-M is more suitable in practical sce-
narios.
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